— Claire Colebrook /via paispapel + pareidoliac
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The Coming Insurrection (via typicaltaylor)
theguywhoinventedfire writes: This is what I plan to open my discussion on the cosmopolitan ethos with tomorrow. before launching into a tirade against post modern and post idelogocial doctrines that have wooed the university - the peddling of superficial ideas and narratives which allow academics to sit in comfortable offices peddling a few journal articles each year - never actually practising what is preached - instead exploiting themselves through the turning of their intellectual property into another capital generating service. prostitution
“It is a great moment at the beginning of Capital as everyone recalls: Marx is wondering in effect how to describe the sudden looming up of the mystical character of the commodity, the mystification of the thing itself — and of the money-form of which the commodity’s simple form is the “germ.” He wants to analyse the equivalent whose enigma and mystical character only strike the bourgeois economist in the finished form of money, gold or silver. It is the moment in which Marx means to demonstrate that the mystical character owes nothing to a use-value.
Is it just chance that he illustrates the principle of his explanation by causing a table to turn? Or rather by recalling the apparition of a turning table? This table is familiar, too familiar; it is found at the opening of the chapter on the fetishism of the commodity and its secret (Geheimnis). This table has been worn down, exploited, over-exploited, or else set aside, no longer in use, in antique shops or auction rooms. The thing is at once set aside and beside itself. Beside itself because, as we will soon be surprised to see, the s id table is a little mad, weird, unsettled, “out of joint.” One no longer knows, beneath the hermeneutic patina, what this piece of wood, whose example suddenly looms up, is good for and what it is worth.
Will that which is going to loom up be a mere example? Yes, but the example of a thing, the table, that seems to loom up of itself and to stand all at once on its paws. It is the example of an apparition.
Let us take the chance, then, after so many glosses, of an ingenuous reading. Let us try to see what happens. But is this not right away impossible? Marx warns us with the first words. The point is right away to go bey rid, in one fell swoop, the first glance and thus to see there where this glance is blind, to open one’s eyes wide there where one does not see what one sees. One must see, at first sight, what does not let itself be seen. And this is invisibility itself. For what first sight misses is the invisible. The flaw„ the error of first sight is to see, and not to notice the invisible. If one does not give oneself up to this invisibility, then the table-commodity, immediately perceived, remains what it is not, a simple thing deemed to be trivial and too obvious. This trivial thing seems to comprehend itself (ein selbst verständliches, triviales Ding): the thing itself in the phenomenality, of its phenomenon, a quite simple wooden table. So as to prepare us to see this invisibility, to see without seeing, thus to think the body without body of this invisible visibility — the ghost is already taking shape — Marx declares that the thing in question, namely, the commodity, is not so simple (a warning that will elicit snickers from all the imbeciles, until the end of time, who never believe anything, of course, because they are so sure that they see what is seen, everything that is seen, only what is seen). The commodity is even very complicated; it is blurred, tangled, paralysing, aporetic, perhaps undecidable (ein sehr vertracktes Ding). It is so disconcerting, this commodity-thing, that one has to approach it with “metaphysical” subtlety and “theological” niceties. Precisely in order to analyse the metaphysical and the theological that constructed the phenomenological good sense of the thing itself, of the immediately visible commodity, in flesh and blood: as what it is “at first sight” (auf den ersten Blick). This phenomenological good sense may perhaps be valid for use-value. It is perhaps even meant to be valid only for use-value, as if the correlation of these concepts answered to this function: phenomenology as the discourse of use-value so as not to think the market or in view of making oneself blind to exchange-value. Perhaps. And it is for this reason that phenomenological good sense or phenomenology of perception (also at work in Marx when he believes he can speak of a pure and simple use-value) can claim to foster Enlightenment since use-value has nothing at all “mysterious” about it (nicht Mysteriöses an ihr). If one keeps to use-value, the properties (Eigenschaften) of the thing (and it is going to be a question of property) are always very human, at bottom, reassuring for this very reason. They always relate to what is proper to man, to the properties of man: either they respond to men’s needs, and that is precisely their use-value, or else they are the product of a human activity that seems to intend them for those needs.
For example — and here is where the table comes on stage — the wood remains wooden when it is made into a table: it is then “an ordinary, sensuous thing [ein ordindäres, sinnliches Ding]”. It is quite different when it becomes a commodity, when the curtain goes up on the market and the table plays actor and character at the same time, when the commodity-table, says Marx, comes on stage (auftritt), begins to walk around and to put itself forward as a market value. Coup de theatre: the ordinary, sensuous thing is transfigured (verwandelt sich), it becomes someone, it assumes a figure. This woody and headstrong denseness is metamorphosed into a supernatural thing, a sensuous non-sensuous thing, sensuous but non-sensuous, sensuously supersensible (verwandelt er sich in ein sinnlich übersinnliches Ding). The ghostly schema now appears indispensable. The commodity is a “thing” without phenomenon, a thing in flight that surpasses the senses (it is invisible, intangible, inaudible, and odourless); but this transcendence is not altogether spiritual, it retains that bodiless body which we have recognised as making the difference between spectre and spirit. What surpasses the senses still passes before us in the silhouette of the sensuous body that it nevertheless lacks or that remains inaccessible to us. Marx does not say sensuous and non-sensuous, or sensuous but non-sensuous.’ he says: sensuous non-sensuous, sensuously supersensible. Transcendence, the movement of super-, the step beyond (über, epekeina), is made sensuous in that very excess. It renders the non-sensuous sensuous. One touches there on what one does not touch, one feels there where one does not feel, one even suffers there where suffering does not take place, when at least it does not take place where one suffers (which is also, let us not forget, what is said about phantom limbs, that phenomenon marked with an X for any phenomenology of perception). The commodity thus haunts the thing, its spectre is at work in use-value. This haunting displaces itself like an anonymous silhouette or the figure of an extra [figurante] who might be the principal or capital character. It changes places, one no longer knows exactly where it is, it turns, it invades the stage with its moves: there is a step there [il ya là un pas] and its allure belongs only to this mutant. Marx must have recourse to theatrical language and must describe the apparition of the commodity as a stage entrance (auftritt). And he must describe the table become commodity as a table that turns, to be sure, during a spiritualist séance, but also as a ghostly silhouette, the figuration of an actor or a dancer. Theo-anthropological figure of indeterminate sex (Tisch, table, is a masculine noun), the table has feet, the tab e has a head, its body comes alive, it erects its whole self like an institution, it stands up and addresses itself to others, first of all to other commodities, its fellow beings in phantomality, it faces them or opposes them, For the spectre is social, it is even engaged in competition or in a war as soon as it makes its first apparition. Otherwise neither socius, nor conflict, nor desire, nor love, nor peace would be tenable.
One would have to put this table on the auction block, subject it to co-occurrence or concurrency, make it speak with so many other tables in our patrimony, so many that we have lost count of them, In philosophy, rhetoric, poetics, from Plato to Heidegger, from Kant to Ponge, and so many others. With all of them, the same ceremony: a séance of the table.”
Impressive piece of prose, as mesmerizing as it is maddening.
Source: Derrida, J., Specters of Marx, the state of the debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International, translated by Peggy Kamuf, Routledge 1994, available at marxists.org h/t @dissemination
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/via katoleary + lavenderlines + notemily + amandaw + jadedhippy + guerrillamamamedicine
“Today, ‘Hinduism’ has been taken axiomatically to denote a religion embraced by a majority of the Indian people in South Asia. Although used by the indigenous Indians themselves before European conquest, the term ‘Hindu’ did not connote a specific religiosity only until the nineteenth century due to Orientalist influences (Chaterjee 1992:147). As a Western explanatory construct, ‘Hinduism’ first grew out of the British legal taxonomy to describe and govern the religious Other in India who was not a Muslim, Christian, Parsee or a Jew (King 1999:99). Dividing (and by effect, constructing) identities along religious lines echoed the ecclesiastical approach in contemporary Britain regarding matters concerning marriage and divorce, property, and religious worship (ibid.).
In the systemisation of Indian identities under colonial order, Richard King has pointed to two significant ways that contributed to the notion of ‘Hinduism’ as a singular, homogenous religious entity: first, through locating the essence of the Indian faith in certain Sanskrit texts and secondly, by the tendency to define and compare Indian religion using contemporary Western understandings of Judaeo-Christian traditions as an epistemological yardstick. These two processes, interwoven and constituting each other, became the main features of the “Westernisation of Indian religion” (King 1999:101). Western presuppositions about ‘religion’ inspired by Protestant theology that placed great emphasis on the role of sacred text at the heart of its believers led the to the scholarly focus on certain Indian literary traditions in the belief that they held the key to understanding ‘Hindu’ people as a unified entity. Many of the early translators of Indian texts were European Christian missionaries, who, in their translations and critical editions of Indian writing, played a significant role in producing a homogenised and reductionist written canon through the Indian materials (Frykenberg 1991:40). As a result, the Indian religious traditions of the oral and ‘popular’ variety were either neglected or dismissed as a degradation of contemporary Hindu religion into superstition practices that did not reflect ‘their’ own texts.
Though the construction of modern ‘Hinduism’ was not a project conducted unilaterally by European scholars, missionaries, and colonial administrators, but a project in collaboration with certain elitist communities belonging particularly to the brahmin castes, hence the contemporary British tendency to emphasise texts representative of the upper caste as central to the Hindu faith. Such a collaboration helped established ‘Hinduism’ to the status ‘world religion’, as first presented famously by Swami Vivekananda at the World Parliament in Chicago in 1893 (Frykenberg 1991:42). The resulting effect of the text-centred ‘brahmanisation’ of Indian religious life as a whole is an anti-historical understanding of an Indian religion that points to the pretensions of an ‘essence’ of ‘Hindu’ people. Such a notional and synchronic approach to conceptualising ‘religion’ is characteristic of Saidian Orientalist discourse that effectively, whether inadvertently or consciously, dehumanise and manipulate the ‘Oriental’ (King 1999:104).”
via clingtomymouth
“Zizek’s “ideology spotting” film critiques aren’t even clever anymore, it’s just the most bland “This thing you like is racist” garbage. And finding out The Hurt Locker is an evil fascist movie isn’t a revelation, it’s right there in the fucking movie. Zizek’s ostensible project, to kill our Big Other, is best accomplished when people fawn over how brilliant he is while he sucks a lot […] It’s probably tiresome to see someone always talking about how Zizek sucks, but it’s tiresome that he always sucks. […]
Instead of just asserting that Zizek sucks, I should be less cowardly and provide a concrete example: He routinely writes up these two or three paragraph discussions of some popular contemporary film, (recently Hurt Locker and Avater)…In them, he spends the first paragraph detailing the supposed reality of the film, ah wonderful aboriginals, ah soldiers with a heart, etc. In the second paragraph, he says no, that’s not right, it’s actually all racist and sexist and war-mad and super ideological. Which, of course, it is if you want to be like that about everything, but how boring and unuseful. It wasn’t interesting that Avatar was racist, it wasn’t interesting that Hurt Locker makes warriors into mushy fragile humans/victims. That’s the secondary content, of which Zizek is the tertiary, explaining how the small racisms / war-madnesses lead to our larger problem. But that’s only if ideology is experienced by audiences as ideology. It’s more interesting to ask about the non-racist content……and why a war-mad country might want to sit and see aboriginal people rise up and kill the metaphor of themselves. But even that’s not the useful stuff, because it would just trend back toward psychologism and easy bullshit about everyone’s “fascism”. The relevant ideology in Avatar was the same as in The Box, the reintegration of a lost technological people into techno-nature.
Anyway, Zizek takes the boring cultural studies moralist approach and never finds something interesting in the shit. After 2 paragraphs on this Hollywood movie, he namedrops some more-or-less obscure counter example(s) to “prove” his point. He wraps it up with something about the greatest, purest, most existing version of a type of ideology or ideological function……and closes it down with a repetition of the same banalities he wrote in the second paragraph. It’s just so unbelievably lazy.
Why not, if you’re actually interested, start with “Lebanon” or “Waltz with Bashir” and then merely comment on “Hurt Locker”? Why use another boring communist reference to link-bait your stunning four paragraph critique of the movie everyone has heard of? It’s so pointlessly /Zizekian/, a cheap shock, a handy knowledge of abstracted structural features & predictable center-left politics.”
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The New Atlantis » Science and the Decline of the Liberal Arts /via ibidem + dissemination
Slightly reactionary & wholesale, in a journal published by the Ethics and Public Policy Center “[established] to clarify and reinforce the bond between the Judeo-Christian moral tradition and the public debate over domestic and foreign policy issues” (ick), and yet, many valid points in this quote.
“There is in truth nothing progressive at all in a ‘laissez faire’ approach to migration which relies for its logic on an extreme neo-liberal position that people should fight ‘dog eat dog’ for economic opportunities wherever they can find them in an unregulated global economy. A new fairer world economic order is not going to be built on this approach. Neither is it persuasive to take the line that because developed, former imperialist powers like the UK have helped to create such an unjust world, mass migration would solve the problem. Research by ippr ‘Development on the move’ to be published in May, shows that migration has largely beneficial development impacts, but the report is quite clear that it does not amount to a development strategy. It is through the pursuit of trade justice, improved governance and economic redistribution that a fairer world will be achieved, not through huge disorganised movements of people.”
Strange to argue like a neoliberal (development, development, development!) using anti-neoliberal arguments… Having said that, it’s still interesting to read something that shuffles ideological cards, even if only for argument’s sake.
P.S. Question: is this “mass migration” an actual phenomenon? Are the huddled masses really swamping Europe? I have a feeling this straw man needs burning…
“You’d be forgiven for thinking that a group of zine-publishing techie squatters into rock music, baiting the State and defending the working class were part of the anarchist left. But, writes the Moyote Project, Italy’s Casa Pound movement is symptomatic of the radical right’s growing ability to assimilate progressive agendas into a toxic and populist political brew.”
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Bas van Fraassen: The Empirical Stance